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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Congress enacted the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA, or the Act)1 out of concern that states were disclosing personal
information contained in motor vehicle records to parties who often
used it for illegal and harmful purposes.2 Specifically, the highly
publicized murder of a young actress by an obsessed fan who obtained
her unlisted address this way, and other incidents of stalking and
harassment, provided the impetus for the legislation.3
DPPA prohibits state departments of motor vehicles from selling
or otherwise “disclosing” certain personal information—including
name, address, social security or driver’s license number, and various
*J.D., May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721-2725 (West 1994).
2
139 CONG. REC. E2747-48 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Moran); 139 CONG. REC. S15745 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Boxer).
3
Id.
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other “identifying” information—without the individual’s express
consent.4 However, the Act contains a fairly expansive list of
exceptions which pertain mainly to safety, government functions, and
litigation.5 Disagreement over what is permissible under these
exceptions, contained in subsection (b) of the Act, has been the source
of recent litigation,6 including Senne v. Village of Palatine, considered
by the Seventh Circuit in 2011.7 In Senne, the plaintiff brought a
putative class-action against a police department alleging that its
practice of including detailed personal information, including name
and address, on parking tickets placed on motorists’ vehicles on public
streets violated his rights under the Act.8 In the since-vacated decision,
the majority ruled this was a “permissible use” under the statute’s
exceptions.9 The full court heard oral arguments in the case en banc in
February 2012.10
The congressional record makes clear that the purpose of DPPA
was to prevent the tragic consequences that can occur when sensitive

4

18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a), 2725(3).
Id. at § 2721(b).
6
§ 2724(a) of DPPA allows for a private cause of action.
7
Senne v. Village of Palatine, 645 F.3d 919, vacated, reh’g en banc granted
(7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2011).
8
Id.
9
Id. In an opinion issued Aug. 6, 2012, the full court reversed the district
court’s dismissal of Senne’s case and the three-judge panel decision affirming it.
See Senne v. Village of Palatine, No. 10-3243, Aug. 6, 2012. Writing for the
majority, Judge Ripple, who had dissented from the earlier decision, held that the
plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts that Palatine’s disclosure of his information
“exceeded that permitted by [DPPA].” Remanding the case to the lower court, the
majority concluded that “…the text of the statute limits the content of authorized
disclosures of protected information in motor vehicle records through its
requirement, clear on its face, that any such disclosure be made ‘[f]or use’ in
effecting a particular purpose exempted by the Act” — and Palatine had yet to show
how it used all of the disclosed information toward that end. Id. at 19.
10
En banc hearing oral arguments, Senne v. Village of Palatine, No. 10-3243
(7th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HM0VFZXG.mp3 (audio).
5
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personal information gets into the wrong hands.11 However, the
Seventh Circuit and other federal courts have generally construed the
Act’s language in favor of public and private entities that claim to be
disclosing and using private information pursuant to the enumerated
exceptions, and against the drivers whose privacy and safety the Act
was created to protect. These courts have broadly interpreted the
exceptions clause and given wide latitude to would-be “disclosers”
and “users” in a way that frustrates the purpose of the Act.12 To date,
no cases have been brought alleging serious crime or violence
resulting from a “permissible” disclosure under the Act, but the
litigation indicates the exceptions are being exploited to provide some
private and state actors a loophole to circumvent the law’s restrictions
and to use individuals’ personal information in ways Congress never
intended.
Even areas of the statute that would seem to be unambiguous—for
example, distinguishing between the original “disclosing” (presumably
done by the state) and subsequent “redisclosures” by recipients of the
information and setting forth different requirements for both13—do not
appear to be helping plaintiffs in trying to assert their rights under the
law. In fact, the Seventh Circuit majority entirely overlooked this
distinction in Senne.14
This Comment proposes that the plain language of the subsection
(b) exceptions clause in DPPA is ambiguous. Therefore, courts should
adopt a much narrower interpretation of what disclosures and uses of
private information are permissible under the subsection consistent
with congressional intent. For instance, the Senne three-judge and en
banc panels divided over the question of whether the exception
11

See Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2; Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2.
For example, the 11th Circuit held that a law firm fell under the
“investigation in anticipation of litigation” permissible-use exception when it
obtained personal information on more than 200,000 drivers from the Florida motor
vehicle department in order to contact some of them as “possible witnesses” in its
fraud action against several auto dealerships. See Thomas v. George, 525 F.3d 1107
(11th Cir. 2008).
13
18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(c).
14
Senne, 645 F.3d at 924-25.
12
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providing: “for use in connection with any . . . criminal [or]
administrative . . . proceeding . . . including service of process”15
meant that a law enforcement agency may use personal information
from state motor vehicle records only to identify and contact (i.e.,
serve or arrest) an individual, or whether the agency may “use” this
information in any conceivable way it chooses so long as its ultimate
purpose is service of process.16 As Judge Diane Wood suggested at the
en banc hearing, does the latter interpretation mean the agency can
even post it on the Internet?17 This would seem to not only frustrate
the purpose of DPPA, but to interpret the language of the Act in a way
that leads to an absurd result.
This Comment argues that, consistent with congressional goals in
enacting DPPA, protecting drivers’ privacy and safety is not
incompatible with efficient government administration and that courts
should employ a more restrictive interpretation of the terms “use” and
“disclose” as contained in the Act. Part I of this Comment reviews
DPPA’s legislative purpose and history as set forth in the congressional
record, federal case law interpreting the subsection (b) exceptions, and
a recent district court opinion calling for a narrow construction. Part II
returns to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of subsection (b) in the sincevacated Senne v. Village of Palatine—including a powerful dissenting
opinion by Judge Ripple that this Comment argues should control—
and the February 2012 en banc rehearing. Part III ties together court
opinions addressing informational privacy, the “plain meaning” rule of
statutory interpretation, and Seventh Circuit precedent to support a
narrower interpretation. This Comment concludes by proposing that
until the United States Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional
privacy interest in personal information or until Congress revisits and
amends DPPA, courts should read the plain language of the exceptions
clause in the context of the statute’s purpose.

15

18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b).
Senne, 645 F.3d 919 et seq.; en banc hearing, supra note 10.
17
En banc hearing, supra note 10.
16
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BACKGROUND

A. Senne v. Village of Palatine
The case that the Seventh Circuit was asked to review in early
2011 began with a routine parking ticket issued the previous summer.18
In August 2010, Jason Senne received a twenty-dollar citation for
parking in a restricted area overnight in the Village of Palatine,
Illinois.19 Compounding the consternation provoked by such an
unpleasant discovery, Senne realized that, per the Village’s policy,
detailed personal information including his name, home address,
driver’s license number, date of birth, and even his height and weight
were electronically printed on the ticket that had been sitting on his
windshield for nearly six hours.20 Palatine’s attorney later conceded
that the Village is alone among Illinois jurisdictions in printing this
extent of personal information on parking tickets, although some
jurisdictions include the registered vehicle owner’s name and home
address.21
Senne filed a putative class-action complaint against the Village in
federal district court alleging that this practice violated his privacy
rights under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), and that it
did not fall under any of the statute’s exceptions.22 Moreover, Senne
maintained, the citation that the personal information is printed on
doubles as a return envelope for the payment, forcing individuals to
“unwittingly” disclose it once more to others who come into contact
18

Senne, 645 F.3d at 920.
Id.
20
Id. at 921.
21
En banc hearing, supra note 10 (counsel for Village explained that ten other
northern Illinois municipalities include a registered owner’s name on a parking
ticket, six include name and address, and one other also includes driver’s license
number). See also Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir.
1991) (most jurisdictions, including the city of Chicago, identify the vehicle owner
on a ticket only by tag number).
22
Complaint, ¶ 10-28, Senne v. Village of Palatine, 645 F.3d 919 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 27, 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-05434), 2011 WL 3459438.
19
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with it once it is sent by mail.23 He accused the Village of “facilitating
the potential for crime” by publicly displaying his personal
information.24
District Court Judge Matthew F. Kennelly granted Palatine’s
motion to dismiss, holding that the parking ticket was not even a
“disclosure” under the Act, and if it were, it was permissible under the
exception allowing use by a law enforcement agency in carrying out
its functions.25 The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s
disclosure determination but still found Palatine’s policy a permissible
use, instead under the exception for service of process in an
administrative proceeding.26
B. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
Prior to DPPA’s enactment in 1994, motor vehicle departments in
roughly 34 states routinely sold private information of licensed drivers
to marketers and other businesses, as well as to any member of the
public who requested it, for a nominal fee.27 Indeed, some states had
garnered substantial revenue from such disclosures.28 By the early
1990s, it was recognized that this practice resulted not only in an
invasion of personal privacy, but occasionally in criminal acts.29 The
passage of DPPA was inspired by several tragic incidents in which
individuals were harassed or killed by people who obtained their
23

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
25
Senne, 645 F.3d at 921; also see 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1).
26
Senne, 645 F.3d at 923-24; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4).
27
139 CONG. REC. S14381 (Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Warner:
“Citizens who wish to operate a motor vehicle have no choice but to register with the
Department of Motor Vehicles and they should do so with full confidence that the
information they provide will not be disclosed indiscriminately.”); Rep. Moran
statement, supra note 2: “[V]ery few Americans realize that by registering their car
or obtaining a driver's license through the DMV, they are surrendering their personal
and private information to anyone who wants to obtain it.”).
28
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143-44 (2000).
29
Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2; Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2.
24

131

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol7/iss2/3

6

Hutchinson: That’s the Ticket: Arguing for a Narrower Interpretation of the E

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 7, Issue 2

Spring 2012

personal information from state motor vehicle departments.30 Most
famously, the television actress Rebecca Schaeffer was shot and killed
by an obsessed fan outside her Los Angeles apartment after he used
her motor vehicle records to find her.31 Lesser-known crimes were also
cited by congressional sponsors. An Arizona woman was murdered by
a man who acquired her address the same way.32 In Iowa, teenagers
wrote down license tag numbers of expensive cars, obtained the
owners’ home addresses from the state, and burglarized the homes.33 A
California man sent threatening letters to five young women whose
addresses he located through the DMV.34
DPPA was a bipartisan effort included in omnibus crime
legislation passed in 1993 as the “Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act.”35 It was sponsored in the U.S. House of
Representatives by Rep. Moran and in the U.S. Senate by Democratic
Senator Barbara Boxer (Cal.) and Republican Senator John Warner
(Va.).36 Its stated purpose was “to protect the personal privacy and
safety of licensed drivers consistent with the legitimate needs of
business and government.”37
1.

Devil is in The Details

The Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq., provides in
pertinent part:

30

Id.
Id.
32
Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2.
33
Id.; Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2.
34
Sen. Boxer statement, supra note 2.
35
Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 136 (West
1994).
36
139 CONG. REC. S15745, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Warner); Rep.
Moran statement, supra note 2.
37
139 CONG. REC. S15764 (Nov. 16, 1993) (emphasis added).
31
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Prohibition on release and use of certain personal information
from State motor vehicle records
(a) In general.—A State department of motor vehicles, and
any officer, employee, or contractor thereof, shall not
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any
person or entity:
(1) personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2725(3), about any individual obtained by the department in
connection with a motor vehicle record, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.38
“Personal information” is defined as “information that identifies
an individual, including . . . photograph, social security number, driver
identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code),
telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not
include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and
driver’s status.” 39
After describing permitted disclosures for safety and theft
purposes, motor vehicle emissions, and product recalls and advisories,
the Act enumerates fourteen specific exceptions permitting disclosure,
with (b)(1) and (b)(4) being the subject of most of the private action
against government actors, including Senne:
(b) Permissible uses.—Personal information referred to
in subsection (a) . . . may be disclosed as follows:
(1) For use by any government agency, including any
court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its
functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a
Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its functions.
(4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal,
administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or
local court or agency or before any self-regulatory body,
including the service of process, investigation in anticipation
38
39

18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a)(1).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2725(3).
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of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments
and orders, or pursuant to an order of a Federal, State, or local
court.40
The remaining exceptions include use related to research
activities, insurance claims investigation and underwriting, providing
notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles, commercial
driver’s licenses, operating toll facilities, and several others requiring
the express consent of the driver, including bulk distribution for
surveys, marketing or solicitations by businesses.41
Subsection (c) of the Act pertains to resale and redisclosure by
“authorized recipients” who have acquired the information from a
state without express consent:
(c) Resale or redisclosure.—Any authorized recipient . . .
that resells or rediscloses personal information covered by
this chapter must keep for a period of 5 years records
identifying each person or entity that receives information
and the permitted purpose for which the information will be
used . . . 42
These common-sense exceptions were an acknowledgement by
Congress that there are many legitimate purposes for state disclosure
of personal identifying information without the owner’s express
consent, particularly to other government entities. But the language in
subsection (b) is open to broad and varying interpretation. For
instance, (b)(1): “for use by a government agency [such as law
enforcement] in carrying out its functions”43 may be interpreted as
disclosure by the state to an agency so it can simply locate or
communicate with an individual for a specific reason, such as
conducting an investigation or issuing a summons. But some interpret
40

18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b).
Id.
42
Id. § 2721(c).
43
Id. § 2721(b).
41
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“for use by” as any use at all the agency chooses to make, regardless
of whether the use exceeds that which is necessary or even reasonable
to effectuate the agency’s purpose.44
Any person who knowingly violates DPPA may be subject to a
criminal fine.45 Section 2724(a) of the Act allows for a private right of
civil action by persons whose information is improperly disclosed
against one who “knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses personal
information … for a purpose not permitted under this chapter.”46 In
addition to actual damages, the Act allows for punitive damages “upon
proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law.”47
States themselves are excluded from the definition of “person” for
purposes of civil actions, but municipalities and law enforcement
agencies are not.48 Individual state actors also are “persons” who may
be sued.49 Courts have held that to “knowingly” disclose means only
that the discloser knew he was disclosing private information, not that
he knew he was disclosing it for an impermissible use.50 In Thomas v.
George, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the private action clause as
requiring a plaintiff asserting a violation of DPPA to prove
impermissible use on the part of the discloser or user of his
information.51

44

See Senne, 645 F.3d at 923-24.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2723(a) .
46
18 U.S.C.A. § 2724(a) .
47
Id. § 2724(a)(b)(2).
48
Id. § 2725(2).
49
Id.
50
Senne, 645 F.3d at 923; Pichler v. Unite, 542 F.3d 380, 397 (3rd Cir. 2008).
51
See Thomas v. George et. al., 525 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that permissible use under DPPA is not an affirmative defense). Impermissible use is
often difficult if not impossible for a plaintiff to prove, especially in cases such as
Thomas, where defendants often solely possess knowledge of their true intentions,
and where a defendant claims attorney-client privilege or some other privilege
preventing disclosure of crucial documents.
45
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C. DPPA Case Law
In Reno v. Condon, the United States Supreme Court held DPPA
constitutional under a Tenth Amendment challenge.52 Condon and
many of the cases brought in the years shortly after passage of the Act
centered on federalism challenges by various states as to whether
Congress could even impose such a restriction on them.53 Besides
Condon, there are only a handful of DPPA cases that have been
decided above the district court level, including several by the Seventh
Circuit.54 However, over the last decade, individuals claiming
violations of their rights under the Act have increasingly brought
private actions to enforce those rights.
In Pichler v. Unite, the Third Circuit held that union organizing
was not a permissible use under the b(4) “investigation in anticipation
of litigation” exception when a labor union contacted potential recruits
whose license tag numbers it had collected from cars in a parking lot.55
However, the Eleventh Circuit found the same exception to apply to a
law firm that obtained information on 284,000 licensed Florida drivers
because some might be “potential witnesses” in its lawsuit against an
automotive dealership, even though it would never contact a large
number of them.56 In Thomas, the law firm claimed it needed the
records in order to obtain evidence of custom and practice in its unfair
52

Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (also finding that Congress enacted
DPPA under its Commerce Clause authority).
53
See Deborah F. Buckman, J.D., Validity, Construction, and Application of
the Federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 183 A.L.R. FED. 37 (2003).
54
See, e.g., Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
DPPA’s restrictions on access to information in public records does not violate the
First Amendment (distinguishing from the Freedom of Information Act) and that it
also does not implicate the 11th Amendment because it excludes states from being
sued by private parties). The Seventh Circuit also held that DPPA affords a private
right of action to individuals whose information is improperly disclosed, but not to
those who seek disclosure. See McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2005)
(plaintiff was in the business of buying cars auctioned to satisfy mechanics’ liens
and wished to obtain information on the vehicles’ owners).
55
Pichler v. Unite, 542 F.3d 380, 395-96 (3rd Cir. 2007).
56
Thomas, 525 F.3d at 1114-15 .
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trade practices claim.57 The court concluded that it did not matter that
the defendant actually used only a small number of the records it
acquired.58 (In contrast, Wemhoff v. District of Columbia held that the
litigation exception did not apply to an attorney who tried to obtain the
identities of motorists caught by red-light cameras in order to bring a
class-action lawsuit against the city).59
1.

Bulk Distribution

Some of the most troubling DPPA permissible-use interpretations
have involved the bulk sale of information to private businesses that
resell it. In Russell v. Choicepoint Services, Inc., a Louisiana district
court held that DPPA permitted an electronic database owner to obtain
records from state DMVs in order to resell them to third parties that
have a “permissible use,” even if it had no such use itself.60 Similarly,
in Young v. West Publishing Corp., a Florida district court held that
DPPA does not require a commercial entity to have an independent
permissible use for information in order to qualify as an “authorized
recipient”; it can resell or redisclose information for purposes of legal
research.61
In Welch v. Jones, another Florida district court decision, the court
held that DPPA allowed the state to sell drivers’ personal information
in bulk to a company that sold it on the Internet, because the
company’s subscribers had to identify themselves and swear under
penalty of perjury they would use the information for one of the
fourteen statutory exceptions.62 The company, Public Data, had
57

Id.
Id. at 1115.
59
Wemhoff v. District of Columbia, 887 A.2d 1004 (D.C. 2005).
60
Russell v. Choicepoint Svcs. Inc., 300 F.Supp.2d 450, 451, 455
(E.D. La. 2004).
61
Young v. West Publ’g. Corp., 724 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
62
Welch v. Jones, 770 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2011). In a remarkable
display of faith in business and personal ethics, the court scoffed at the plaintiff’s
argument that a Public Data subscribing customer might falsely claim a permissible
use because: (1) a subscriber would not likely pay a “substantial sum” for the records
58
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purchased drivers’ information from the state of Florida to resell to its
customers.63 In a startlingly broad reading of the exceptions clause, the
court found Public Data had properly obtained the information
pursuant to the §2721(b)(3) exception “for use ... by a legitimate
business” to verify a customer’s identity,64 even if it may never need
the information and even if the people whose information was
obtained never actually became “customers.”65 The court reasoned that
its interpretation was a “more comfortable” reading of the “for use”
language in the exceptions clause, “especially in a statute imposing
civil liabilities and fines,” and concluded that if it led to improper use
of information, it was up to Congress to correct it.66
2.

Privacy in Public Information: Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong

In support of its holding, the Welch court cited Taylor v. Acxiom, a
2010 Fifth Circuit decision that also broadly interpreted the Act to
allow the bulk disclosure of information to commercial entities that
resell it without making permissible use of the information
themselves.67 The court held that such “bulk obtainment” did not
without a legitimate purpose, and (2) it was risking prosecution for perjury if it did
so.
63
Id. at 1255.
64
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(3) (allowing disclosure “for use in the normal
course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employees, or contractors,
but only (A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the
individual to the business or its agents, employees, or contractors; and (B) if such
information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the
correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal
remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the
individual.”).
65
Welch, 770 F.Supp.2d at 1259 (“Had Congress intended §2721(b) to require
actual use—rather than only a purpose to use when appropriate—it could have said
so. And had Congress intended information to be disclosed only for an individual
transaction, rather than in bulk, it could have said that, too. But it did not.”)
(emphasis added).
66
Id. at 1260-61.
67
Id. at 1259; Taylor v. Acxiom, 612 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2010).
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violate DPPA and justified its holding by misinterpreting the
§2721(b)(11) requirement of express consent for bulk disclosure of
information for marketing purposes68 as therefore allowing bulk
disclosure without express consent for any of the other permissible
purposes a purchaser may have.69 The court described the Act as a
“crime-fighting measure” and cited the legislative record to support its
conclusion that DPPA was aimed only at preventing victimization
from crime: “The totality of the legislative history clearly reflects that
Congress did not intend to suppress legitimate business uses of motor
vehicle records” (emphasis in original).70
However, the record indicates that in passing DPPA, Congress
was concerned not only with physical safety but with personal privacy,
apart from violent or threatening criminal acts.71 Indeed, the very
name of the Act, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, demonstrates
68

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(b)(12) (“for bulk distribution for surveys, marketing
or solicitations if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom
such personal information pertains”).
69
Taylor, 612 F.3d at 335 (“Of the fourteen expressly listed permissible uses,
only once does Congress limit a permissible use to individual motor records. And of
these … only once does Congress limit a permissible use to bulk distribution. For the
remaining twelve permissible uses, the statute seems to have more than one
reasonable interpretation: individual release, bulk release, or both”(internal citations
omitted; emphasis in original)).
70
Id. at 336. The court noted that the purpose of the statute supports the
conclusion that Congress intended bulk distribution. However, the court’s reasoning
seems to overlook the possibility that the information could be improperly obtained
by someone posing as a legitimate purchaser in order to commit a crime.
71
See, e.g., Sen. Moran statement, supra note 2: “By enacting this legislation,
Congress will reaffirm that privacy is not a Democratic or Republican issue, but a
basic human right to which every person is entitled”; Sen. Warner statement, supra
note 27: “In today's world, both personal privacy and personal safety are
disappearing and this legislation would help to protect both. The bill incorporates the
intentions of the 1974 Privacy Act, which addresses the collection of personal
information by Federal agencies. The bill also includes the recommendations of the
1977 Privacy Protection Study Commission report.”). See also 139 CONG. REC.
S15764, supra note 37: “The purpose of this Act is to protect the personal privacy
and safety of licensed drivers consistent with the legitimate needs of business and
government”(emphasis added).
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that the intent of Congress was not only preventing crime. A further
sign of this is that in 1999, Congress amended DPPA to prohibit direct
marketers from obtaining personal information from motor vehicle
records without a person’s express consent.72 Previously, a person had
to actively opt out of this type of disclosure when applying for a
license.73 This amendment has been viewed as a legislative recognition
that individuals have an expectation of privacy in information they
voluntarily disclose to the government that supersedes the interests of
business, and they even retain the right to control its use after that
disclosure.74
3.

Wiles v. Worldwide: Call for a Narrow Interpretation of
Permissible Uses

At least one federal court has called for a narrower interpretation
of the exceptions clause in DPPA in light of its ambiguity.75 In Wiles v.
Worldwide Information Inc., a Western District of Missouri court
accused the Fifth Circuit of misapplying the expressio unius maxim76
in Taylor v. Acxiom and criticized the reasoning in that case and in
Russell v. Choicepoint. 77 The Wiles case also dealt with a state’s sale
of its entire driver’s license database to a reseller that did not itself use
the information.78 The decision appears to be the first to hold that
under DPPA, nondisclosure of personal information is the default rule

72

Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 1025 (1994)
(amended 1999).
73
See Maureen Maginnis, Maintaining the Privacy of Personal Information:
The DPPA and the Right of Privacy. 51 S.C. L. REV. 807, 811 (2000).
74
Id. at n.33.
75
Wiles v. Worldwide Info. Inc., 809 F.Supp.2d 1059 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
76
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: “The expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another.” BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (3d ed. 1991).
77
Wiles, 809 F.Supp.2d at1069-1072.
78
Id. at 1063-64 (a customer of the reseller could then obtain the entire license
database so long as it claimed a permissible purpose to access just one of the names
in it).
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and not the exception.79 Writing for the majority, Judge Nanette K.
Laughrey observed: “[N]owhere does the DPPA enumerate any
‘prohibited purposes’ or ‘prohibited uses.’ Rather, the statute generally
prohibits all but the fourteen permissible uses enumerated in section
2721(b).”80 As such, the judge concluded, a recipient should have to
show a specific permissible use before obtaining information on any
individual, which a reseller, such as the defendant, could not do.81
Judge Laughrey observed that the court’s holding deviated from
the majority of federal courts that have considered the issue: “The
majority of courts reason that so long as the private information is not
actually used in a ‘prohibited’ manner there is no violation of
DPPA . . . [y]et the DPPA never explicitly lists any prohibited uses;
rather it generally prohibits all but . . . fourteen . . . uses.”82 To
illustrate the irony of this reasoning, Judge Laughrey proposed that a
tow truck operator could obtain an entire license database, including
social security numbers, because one day it might need to tow the car
of an individual in the database.83
Judge Laughrey’s opinion also seems to be one of the few to
consider DPPA’s legislative purpose and history and not just its plain
language.84 Having reviewed both, she concluded that “Congress did
not intend the DPPA to authorize this widespread dissemination of
private information untethered from the very uses that Congress listed
79

Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1073.
81
Id. (reasoning that the §2721(c) language limiting redisclosure by
“authorized recipients” could only mean Congress intended these recipients to be
individuals or entities qualified themselves to receive information under one of the
fourteen exceptions; to read the section otherwise leads to the absurd result “that
resellers could obtain all of the personal information in the database simply by
calling themselves resellers, while everyone else—including law enforcement—
would have to justify their receipt . . . under the 2721(b) exception applicable to
them.” Congress could not have intended such a “gaping hole” in the statute).
82
Id. at 1061, 1063.
83
Id. at 1063.
84
See id. at 1065 (“the [c]ourt interprets the DPPA in accordance with its plain
language and legislative purpose”); see also id. at 1066-68.
80
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in the DPPA.”85 Judge Laughrey concluded that the “overriding
purpose” of the statute was to protect drivers’ privacy, made plain by
its title: the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.86 As such, Congress could
not have intended greater latitude for an authorized recipient to
disclose upon resale or redisclosure than the state has upon initial
disclosure: “Congress, like its constituents, feared that private
information widely circulated in vast databases would be intentionally
or inadvertently leaked . . . [n]or would there be a viable way to know
whether unscrupulous individuals within recipient organizations were
secretly trolling through drivers’ personal information to learn about a
neighbor or ex-girlfriend.”87
Finally, the Wiles opinion advanced a conclusion that can be
applied to most cases alleging violations of DPPA by any recipient,
government or private: “The interpretation most consistent with
Congressional intent requires that disclosure of personal information
be narrowly tailored to a specific permissible purpose.”88
II. SEVENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF DPPA EXCEPTIONS
CLAUSE
In most of the litigation surrounding DPPA, the courts have
addressed federalism issues and disclosure of personal information to
private parties, but the issue of disclosure to or use by public entities
has seldom arisen.89 While the district court in Senne found Palatine’s
ticketing policy permissible under the subsection (b)(1) “government
agency function” exception,90 the Seventh Circuit majority instead
found for the Village under (b)(4): “service of process” in an
administrative proceeding.91 On appeal the plaintiff had argued that
85

Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1068.
87
Id. at 1068-69.
88
Id. at 1076.
89
See generally Buckman, supra note 53.
90
Senne, 645 F.3d at 921.
91
Id. at 923-24.
86
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the Village’s public display of his information was “not inextricably
tied to its ability to issue, serve, or enforce parking citations.”92 In
affirming dismissal of the complaint, the Seventh Circuit majority
concluded that subsection (b)(4) does not dictate “best practices” to
government agencies, but instead gives them carte blanche to use the
information any way they choose, even if that use is not reasonable or
necessary.93
A. Plaintiff’s Case: The Meaning of “Use” in DPPA
The crux of Senne’s argument centered around the meaning of
“use” and “disclose” as provided in subsection (b).94 He argued that
publicly posting his private information on a parking ticket was not
among the “uses” contemplated by Congress when it drafted the
exceptions clause; specifically, Palatine’s disclosure to a stranger was
not the same as a “use” by Palatine in carrying out a law enforcement
function.95 He contended that Palatine violated DPPA by disclosing his
information “to persons or entities outside its law enforcement
agency.”96 Senne further argued that Palatine’s disclosure was more
dangerous than those that facilitated the notorious incidents preceding
DPPA, because an individual did not have to take any steps to obtain
his information—the Village made it “immediately available” on a
public street,97 thus “facilitating criminal activity.”98 The ticketing
policy “is priceless to identity thieves” who get “a treasure trove of

92

Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir.
Dec. 31, 2010) (No. 10-3243), 2010 WL 6020493.
93
Senne, 645 F.3d at 924.
94
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, 14-17, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir.
Nov. 17, 2010) (No. 10-3243), 2010 WL 6020495.
95
Id. at 6-7 (arguing that “obtain,” “use,” and “disclose” as defined in the law
were distinct acts that each required a permissible use independent of each other).
96
Id. at 6.
97
Id. at 8.
98
Id. at 19.
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free information” from the Village,99 made all the more eye-catching
by the bright yellow form of the citation.100
Senne also argued that the Village was making a redisclosure of
his information as defined under the Act, which is further restricted by
subsection (c):101 “Does Palatine have any greater right to disclose
‘personal information’ it receives from ‘motor vehicle records’ than
the [states] that collect the information have themselves?” he asked.102
He argued that if someone made a direct in-person request to the
Village, it would never release to them the same information which it
knowingly prints on a parking citation and “slap[s] . . . on the
windshield,” viewable by any passerby.103 “Palatine’s actions are a
clear violation of the letter and spirit of DPPA and the core . . .
principles [on] which all privacy laws are based.”104
In its reply, Palatine argued that the only person alleged to have
actually seen the ticket was Senne himself, and that it did not
“knowingly” place the ticket on his windshield for third parties to
use.105 Palatine argued the ticket was an administrative complaint.106
Noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized parking tickets
as complaints,107 it defended its practice: “the relevant inquiry [under
DPPA] is not whether a defendant used the information permissibly,
but whether he had a permissible purpose.”108 But does the law so
distinguish between use and purpose? Only the Third Circuit seems to
99

Id. at 9 (noting that in the United States, a driver’s license is the primary
source of identification).
100
Id. at 12-13.
101
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(a)(c).
102
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 94 at 15 (also arguing “if the
Illinois secretary of state can’t post personal information from motor vehicles,
neither can Palatine.” Id. at 18).
103
Id. at 19.
104
Id. at 27.
105
Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 1, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir.
Dec. 17, 2010) (No. 10-3243), 2010 WL 6020494.
106
Id. at 15-19.
107
Id. at 16.
108
Id. at 20.
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have distinguished “permissible use” from “permissible purpose,”
finding the fact that a party seeking information may have a
permissible purpose in doing so does not make any use it then makes
of the information permissible.109
B. Majority’s Analysis
The three-judge panel of Easterbrook, Ripple, and Flaum
unanimously reversed the district court’s finding that the parking ticket
was not a disclosure as defined in the Act, but split over whether it was
permitted by the statute.110 Writing for himself and Judge Easterbrook,
Judge Joel M. Flaum explained that in examining the plain language of
the statute to discern legislative intent, the court had to look at the
words and their meaning in the context of the statutory scheme.111
However, this was not borne out by the reasoning that followed.
Significantly, nowhere in the opinion did the majority discuss the
policy or purpose behind DPPA.112
After citing the subsection (b)(4) exception “for use in connection
with . . . service of process,” Judge Flaum noted that a parking citation
constitutes service of legal process under both Illinois law and Palatine

109

Pilcher, 542 F.3d at 395. Does the assumption that a person has violated the
law (by getting a parking citation) make it more acceptable for a governmental entity
to “use” the information in ways it could not otherwise? Palatine in its answer brief
referred to the plaintiff as a “ticket scofflaw” who was looking to skirt his fine and
get a “payday.” Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 105 at 5. (This was
factually erroneous as: (1) plaintiff claimed he did pay his fine, and (2) a scofflaw is
generally defined not as a person who receives a fine, but who fails to pay one; See
Dictionary.com: “a person who flouts the law, especially one who fails to pay fines
owed,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scofflaw?s=t. Plaintiff claimed he
was not aware he was parking illegally. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra
note 92 at 6.) The implication is that plaintiff deserved the public shaming for
parking where he was not supposed to, and therefore had no right to complain about
a violation of privacy.
110
Senne, 645 F.3d at 925 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 922.
112
Id., et seq.
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municipal ordinance.113 “Because affixing the parking citation to
Senne’s vehicle constituted service of process, disclosing personal
information in the citation did not violate the DPPA,” he concluded.114
Judge Flaum rejected the idea that the language in subsection (b) is
ambiguous and noted the irony that as the Act is written, a permissible
use could constitute an unlawful disclosure of otherwise protected
information.115 He also rejected Senne’s arguments about the
recklessness and senselessness of Palatine’s policy: “The statute does
not ask whether the service of process reveals no more information
than necessary to effect service, and so neither do we.”116
The majority similarly rejected Senne’s redisclosure argument,
stating that even if the act of putting the citation in the mail amounted
to a redisclosure, it would be Senne himself doing the redisclosing and
not the Village.117 This analysis fails to consider the idea that the initial
disclosure of the information was made by the state to Palatine as an
“authorized recipient,” and Palatine’s act of placing the information in
a public place was not also a disclosure, but a redisclosure that should
be subject to the Act’s restrictions on redisclosures.118
C. Judge Ripple’s Dissent
In an impassioned dissent, Judge Kenneth Ripple accused the
majority of “significantly frustrating” the intent and purpose of
Congress.119 Calling Palatine’s disclosure “excessive,” he asserted that
113

Id. at 923, citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11 208.3(b)(3) and Village of
Palatine Ordinance 2-707(b)(3).
114
Id. at 924.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 924-25.
118
See 18 U.S.C.A. §2721(c) (requiring that redisclosure also be for one of the
fourteen permitted purposes and that the rediscloser keep records of whom the
information was released to for five years. Of course, it would be impossible for
Palatine to accomplish this in the context of a parking ticket, which further supports
the idea that it effects an impermissible redisclosure).
119
Senne, 645 F.3d at 926 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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its use of Senne’s information was not protected by either the (b)(1)
law enforcement function or (b)(4) service of process exceptions,120 as
such information is “of no consequence” for the purpose of issuing a
ticket.121 He accused the majority of “largely ignor[ing] … the very
problem that Congress sought to address.”122 In adding the exceptions
to the statute, Judge Ripple argued, Congress had attempted to strike a
balance between an individual’s privacy and security interests and the
legitimate operational needs of government, which the majority had
misconstrued as “administrative convenience.”123 He argued that
Congress had contemplated disclosures that were “reasonable” in
effecting a permitted use, and to conclude otherwise would infer that it
deliberately intended to frustrate the purpose of the statute.124 The
information disclosed on Senne’s ticket bore “no reasonable
relationship to the purpose” of the ticket, which is to notify a vehicle
owner that he is financially liable for a violation:125 “Congress did not
intend that the statutory exceptions be divorced, logically or
practically, from the purpose of the statute . . . [w]e should not ascribe
to Congress the intent to sanction the publication of any and all
personal information through the invocation of an exception”
(emphasis in original).126
To support his position, Judge Ripple quoted Sen. Harkin on the
subject of excessive disclosure:
In appropriate circumstances, law enforcement agencies may
reasonably determine that disclosure of this private
information . . . will assist in carrying out the function of the
120

Id. at 925.
Id. at 926.
122
Id. at 927.
123
Id. at 926-27.
124
Id. at 926. In response, Judge Flaum’s opinion faulted the dissent for not
providing a “textual foundation for its interpretation of the statute, which Congress
of course remains at liberty to amend.” Id. at n.1.
125
Id. (citing the Seventh Circuit’s previous holding in Saukstelis v. City of
Chicago, at 1174 that a license plate number alone uniquely identifies a person).
126
Id.
121
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agency . . . However, this exception is not a gaping loophole
in the law.127
Scathing in his criticism, Judge Ripple warned that the
consequences of the majority’s decision were not theoretical: “An
individual seeking to stalk or rape can go down a street where
overnight parking is banned and collect the home address and personal
information of women whose vehicles have been tagged … [t]he
police, in derogation of the explicit intent of Congress, effectively
[have] done his work for him in identifying potential victims.”128 He
added that the revealing of home addresses was the most egregious
form of unreasonable disclosure, as it was the exact thing Congress
had sought to prevent.129 Moreover, the majority’s decision had given
“shelter” to “less sophisticated police departments, more prone to
bureaucratic convenience . . . consequently, their communities will
incur horrendous crimes of violence that would not otherwise have
occurred.”130
Judge Ripple did not address in his dissent the
disclosure/redisclosure argument raised by Senne, nor the plain
meaning of “use,” but focused almost entirely on the intent and
purpose of Congress.
D. En Banc Rehearing
On September 13, 2011, the Seventh Circuit granted Senne’s
petition for a rehearing en banc and vacated the panel decision.131 The
en banc rehearing was held on February 9, 2012.132 In his petition,
127

Id. at 926, n.2 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S15958 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Harkin)).
128
Id. at 927.
129
Id. at 928.
130
Id.
131
Order, Senne v. Village of Palatine (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2011) (No. 10-3243).
132
En Banc Reh’g Oral Arguments, Senne v. Village of Palatine, No. 10-3243
(Feb. 9, 2012), Seventh Circuit Website:
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HA1FG9EH.mp3 (audio).
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Senne argued that the court’s holding that Palatine’s practice was legal
under state and local law characterizing parking citations as service of
process was in conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court in Reno v.
Condon and the Seventh Circuit in Travis v. Reno.133 Those cases held
that DPPA pre-empts conflicting state law.134 He reiterated his
argument that the “for use” language in the DPPA exceptions clause
was in itself limiting language that requires disclosures to be
“reasonably necessary” to effect a permissible purpose, and that to
allow Palatine’s practice under DPPA leads to “an absurd result.”135
At the rehearing, the full court appeared split on whether
Palatine’s practice met the requirements for permissible use.136 Judge
Richard Posner accused Senne of asking the court to create a “gigantic
jurisprudence” in connection with DPPA and suggested the law should
instead be modified by Congress.137 Judge Posner expressed
skepticism that members of the public would actually misuse the
information printed on parking tickets.138 He and Judge Diane Sykes
seemed to come down on the side of what Judge Ripple’s dissent had
called “administrative convenience” and defended the practice as an
identification tool for the court. 139 If law enforcement can identify an
offender in a charging document, Judge Sykes argued, then a parking
ticket is no different from any charging document that initiates the
court process.140 Municipal practices “vary from place to place,” she

133

Petition of Plaintiff-Appellant for Reh’g at 1, Senne v. Village of Palatine,
(7th Cir. July 25, 2011) (No. 10-3243 ), (arguing that the majority in any event had
misapplied the state statute it relied upon, in that the statute does not actually equate
a parking ticket with an administrative complaint or service of process. Id. at 8.).
134
Id. at 4-5.
135
Id. at 11.
136
En banc reh’g, supra note 132.
137
Id.
138
Id. (asking Senne’s counsel “Have you noticed people wandering around
and peeking under parking tickets?” and adding “your imagination is running
wild.”).
139
Id.; Senne, 645 F.3d at 927 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
140
En banc reh’g, supra note 132.
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added.141 Judge Ilana Rovner noted the absence of language in the Act
requiring the use of only “necessary” information.142 Other judges said
there are varying views of what is “reasonable.”143
On the other hand, some of the judges raised the specter of the
crimes that precipitated the Act’s passage and others such as identity
theft.144 Judge Diane Wood was the harshest critic of the Village’s
position.145 She allowed that name and address “might be pertinent” to
a parking ticket, but not height, weight, sex or eye color, which “does
not further service of process.”146 “Are there any limitations on how
the information is used?” she demanded of Palatine.147 “Can you
publish a person’s information in legal notices in a newspaper or on a
website? I don't see why most of this information is necessary for
serving process. I would think the way to read the statute is that
[disclosing] each one of these [pieces of information] needs to be
justified under the (b)(4) exemptions.”148 Palatine’s counsel argued
that much of the personal information in question is publicly available
for purchase anyway on such websites as Whitepages.com and
Westlaw.149 However, Judge John Tinder noted that Illinois does not
require such information to be included on a summons, and Judge
David Hamilton asked about the “for use” phrase in (b)(4), expressing
doubt about the usefulness of disclosing height, weight, and other
personal information.150
141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. Judge Wood in particular hammered away on this point, invoking an
“identity theft crisis.”
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. Judge Wood suggested that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was not the
proper stage of litigation to address the issues raised by both plaintiff and defendant,
asking Palatine’s counsel “which is worse, an influx of litigation or an influx of
violence?”
149
Id.
150
Id.
142

150

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 7, Issue 2

Spring 2012

III. SUPPORT FOR A NARROWER INTERPRETATION OF
SUBSECTION 2721(B)
A narrower interpretation of §2721(b), one that would allow relief
for Jason Senne and the plaintiffs in the bulk distribution cases, is
supported by court opinions and accepted canons of statutory
construction. It is also supported by the Seventh Circuit’s own prior
interpretations of DPPA and the powers of a law enforcement agency
in enforcing motor vehicle laws.
A. Privacy Interests in Personal Identifying Information
In Reno v. Condon, the only case in which the United States
Supreme Court has considered DPPA, the Court did not address
informational privacy issues.151 The Court has recognized an
individual privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of certain personal
matters,152 but not in one’s name, address, phone number or the other
types of information typically contained in state motor vehicle
records.153 However, the proliferation of technology to collect and
disseminate information and its ramifications on privacy have caused
concern to Congress and the courts.154 In Walls v. City of St.
Petersburg, the Fourth Circuit cautioned that:

151

See Maginnis, supra note 71 at 820.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (recognizing a privacy
interest in medical information).
153
See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998); Walls. v. City of St.
Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding a privacy interest in financial
information, but not in information contained in public records, since there can be no
expectation of privacy in it).
154
Walls, 895 F.2d at 194-95. See also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605, and U.S.
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764,
770 (1989), discussed infra pp. 27-28.
152

151
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technological advances have provided society with the ability
to collect, store, organize, and recall vast amounts of
information about individuals in sophisticated computer
files . . . Although some of this information can be useful and
even necessary to maintain order and provide communication
and convenience in a complex society, we need to be ever
diligent to guard against misuse. Some information still needs
to be private, disclosed to the public only if the person
voluntarily chooses to disclose it.155
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court warned of “the threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks or other massive government
files . . . much of which is personal in character and potentially
embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.”156 In dicta that has particular
significance to the issues raised with DPPA, the Court reasoned that
the right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by “a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures . . . [r]ecognizing that in some circumstances
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution ”.157 Here, it can be
argued that although Palatine had the right to obtain and use Senne’s
data to enforce its parking laws, it also had a statutory duty under
DPPA to avoid unwarranted disclosure of his information.
Writing for the majority in United States Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Justice John Paul
Stevens expanded on the dicta of Whalen: “The compilation of
otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy interest
155

Id.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. Also see Maginnis, supra note 73 at 817 (arguing
that a compilation of information about an individual –such as name, address, social
security number, etc. –is more dangerous in the wrong hands than a single piece of
information, since someone can more easily use a collection of information to
impersonate an individual or do other harm).
157
Id. (emphasis added) . See also id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The
central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the
potential for abuse of that information ...”).
156

152
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implicated by disclosure of that information … [in Whalen we held]
only that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit such a
compilation.”158 Justice Stevens noted that even though “in an
organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or
another divulged to another,” the Court has recognized “the privacy
interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye,” including
“the nondisclosure of certain information even where [it] may have
been at one time public.”159
In Wolfe v. Schaefer, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Whalen to
recognize a “constitutional right to the privacy of medical, sexual,
financial, and perhaps other categories of highly personal
information . . . that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers,”
which is “defeasible only upon proof of a strong public interest in
access to or dissemination of the information.” 160 However, that case
dealt mainly with a plaintiff’s personal reputation.161 In Best v. Berard,
a 2011 DPPA case also before Judge Kennelly of the Northern District,
the defendants, producers of a reality police television show, argued
that the plaintiff, who was filmed being pulled over and arrested, had
no right of privacy in her driver’s license number because it is publicly
available information.162 The plaintiff countered that the Supreme
Court “foreclosed” this argument in Reporters Committee because of
its reasoning that a “compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain
information” may be entitled to heightened privacy protection even
though it consists only of “public records that might be found after a
diligent search.”163 Judge Kennelly, however, observed that Reporters
Committee was limited to interpreting the Freedom of Information Act
and therefore did not address an expectation of privacy under the
158

Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 770 .
Id. at 763, 767, 769.
160
Wolfe v. Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2010).
161
Id.
162
Best v. Berard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131572, 1-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15,
2011). The court did not address the right of privacy under DPPA because the
defendants argued they did not knowingly disclose under the Act, an argument the
court rejected.
163
Id. at 10 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767).
159
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Constitution.164 “[The plaintiff] does not . . . identify any other basis
for a contention that she has a constitutionally protected privacy
interest in [her drivers license number].”165 The plaintiff’s citing of the
Seventh Circuit’s Wolfe v. Schaefer reasoning also failed to convince
the judge, who concluded: “The categories of information that the
Seventh Circuit has deemed protected by the constitutional privacy
right have been far more personal, such that their disclosure would
lead to greater potential for embarrassment or abuse.”166
B. Statutory Interpretation: Plain Meaning and the “Whole
Statute” Rule
With no express recognition of a privacy interest in personal
information contained in public records from either the Supreme Court
or Seventh Circuit, any protection of that right must be statutory.
Congress likely enacted DPPA to protect these interests partly because
constitutional law, at present, does not. This section analyzes how
various constructions of DPPA can support a finding for Jason Senne
and hold Palatine’s policy violative of his rights under the Act.
1.

Literal Interpretation

DPPA’s congressional supporters made clear that privacy and
safety concerns were the driving force behind the legislation.167
164

Id. (quoting United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 284 (7th Cir.
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
165
Id. at 11.
166
Id. at 9 (citing cases involving HIV infection and use of prescription drugs).
167
See Rep. Moran statement, supra note 2; Sen. Boxer statement, supra note
2; See also 140 CONG. REC. H2527 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Goss): “[T]he intent of this bill is simple and straightforward: We want to stop
stalkers from obtaining the name and address of their prey before another tragedy
occurs ... The [DPPA] balances the legitimate public and business interests in
keeping these records available with an individual driver's right to privacy”; and
statement of Rep. Morella: “Allowing a government agency to aid stalkers in
locating those they are harassing is untenable.”
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Although Judge Ripple accused the Senne majority of frustrating the
purpose and intent of Congress through a rigid reading of “for use in
… service of process,” a pure textual reading still supports a finding
for Senne.168 “The plain language of the statute [is] the best indication
of Congressional intent”169 and in this endeavor the court looks to a
word or phrase’s “common, ordinary and accepted meaning,”
sometimes consulting dictionary definitions and general word
usage.170 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “for use” as “for the benefit
or advantage of another.” 171 Merriam-Webster defines “use” as a verb:
“(a) to put into action or service; avail oneself of (employ); (b) to carry
out a purpose or action by means of ”; and as a noun: “the act or
practice of employing something.”172 Palatine’s act of placing drivers’
private information on vehicles does not put that information “into
action or service” in collecting parking fines, nor is Palatine
“employing” it to collect fines, nor does it “benefit or advantage”
Palatine in collecting fines. The Village can accomplish that by
communicating directly with the offender privately. Further, even if
the plain meaning of “use” were so all-encompassing as to allow for
Palatine’s actions, it would run afoul of the accepted judicial axiom
that a statute should be applied according to its plain meaning except
when it produces absurd results.173
A plain language reading of subsection (c) of the Act, along with
Senne’s holding that Palatine’s ticket policy amounts to a “disclosure,”
justifies the conclusion that Palatine, as an “authorized recipient,” is
168

See Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (if text is clear, court won’t
look at legislative history); See also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:1
(7th ed.) (“the starting point in statutory construction is to read and examine the text
of the act and draw inferences concerning the meaning from its composition and
structure.”).
169
Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Smith v. City of
Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 249 (2005).
170
Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:1.
171
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 567 (Abridged 9th ed. 2010).
172
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at: http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/use (last accessed May 3, 2012).
173
Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:1.
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actually redisclosing the information to the public, which it may not do
to parties with no permissible use themselves.174
2.

The ‘Whole Statute’ Rule

A more appropriate reading of the DPPA exceptions clause would
be under the “whole statute rule,” which provides that “[a] statute is
passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one
general purpose and intent,” therefore “each part should be construed
in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious
whole.”175 Thus, interpretation should not be confined to the one
section to be construed (as the courts have done with §2721(b)),
because “a statutory subsection may not be considered in a
vacuum.”176 The Supreme Court expressed this “cardinal rule” in King
v. St. Vincent’s Hospital: “[A] statute is to be read as a whole, since the
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.”177
Under “whole statute” construction it is impossible to consider the
legislative scheme of DPPA and interpret “for use” in the manner the
Seventh Circuit did in Senne and other recent federal court decisions
have interpreted it.
In the 1943 case SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the U.S.
Supreme Court held that ultimately, “courts will construe the details of
an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read
text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the
meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular
cases the generally expressed legislative policy.”178
174

See 18. U.S.C.A. §2721(c); Senne, 645 F.3d at 923.
Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:5. See also U.S. Nat’l. Bank of Oregon
v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993): “Over and over we
have stressed that ‘in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and
to its object and policy.’”
176
Sutherland, supra note 168 at § 46:5.
177
King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (internal citations
omitted).
178
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350–351 (1943).
175
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Ambiguity in Subsection (b) and Absurd Results

An argument may also be made that the “for use in” language in
subsection (b) is in fact ambiguous, given the disparity in how
different courts, and dissenting opinions within those courts, have
interpreted its meaning. A statute is considered ambiguous when it is
susceptible to differing interpretations.179 When a statute’s language is
ambiguous and applying it according to its plain meaning would lead
to an absurd result, or there is clear evidence of contrary legislative
intent, the court will “look to the legislative history of the statute to
guide our interpretation.”180
The legislative history of DPPA as contained in congressional
statements discussed supra points to an absurd result in recent federal
appeals court applications. Moreover, the freedom of municipal
agencies in initiating proceedings against individuals, as championed
by the Senne majority and several judges at the en banc hearing, is not
threatened by limiting those agencies’ use of personal information to
what is objectively reasonable. Rep. Porter Goss, a supporter of DPPA,
addressed this “balancing” of interests at a House debate: “[The Act]
does not prohibit legitimate business, law enforcement and
governmental access to such information. The flow of information
would only be denied to a narrow group of people that lack legitimate
business.”181
The Seventh Circuit has already stated that it would not employ a
literal interpretation of DPPA in a way that leads to an absurd result.182
In Lake v. Neal, a 2009 DPPA case before the court, Judge Evans
wrote for the majority: “Finally, we would not accept [plaintiff’s]
argument even if a literal interpretation of the DPPA would seem to

179

See Sutherland, supra note 172.
Id.; Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1986).
181
140 CONG. REC. H2527 (statement of Rep. Goss) (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994).
182
Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 2009).
180
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compel it because that would ‘lead to an absurd result.’”183 In the same
opinion, the court acknowledged the Act’s legislative history:
“Congress passed the DPPA in response to safety and privacy
concerns stemming from the ready availability of personal information
contained in state motor vehicle records.”184 Displaying a person’s
name, address, date of birth, and driver’s license number in a way that
the information may be viewed by strangers who have no legitimate
interest in it can be interpreted as an absurd result in light of the
statute’s expressed purpose.
1.

Saukstelis v. City of Chicago

The Seventh Circuit—in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, who
was in the Senne majority—has already found that a license plate
number alone is sufficient to identify an offender for authorities.185 In
Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, the plaintiffs challenged the city’s
practice of applying the Denver boot to vehicles that had accumulated
a certain number of parking tickets.186 They argued that because the
citations included their vehicle tag numbers but not their names, they
were not given proper notice.187 Rejecting this argument, the court
found that a tag number was sufficient in itself to identify a vehicle’s
owner without name:
Parking tickets effectively say: ‘Chicago, Plaintiff, versus
Owner of the vehicle with License No. xxxx, Defendant.’
That identifies the parties to the suit even better than a name
does. Only one person matches a given license plate, while
there are many “John Smiths.” … A license number uniquely
183

Id. (Plaintiffs claimed violation of DPPA because information contained in
their voter registration records had been disclosed; the court held they could not rely
on DPPA just because plaintiffs had registered to vote at the DMV at the time they
applied for their drivers licenses.)
184
Id. (emphasis added).
185
Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 1991).
186
Id. at 1172-73.
187
Id. at 1174.

158

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012

33

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 7, Issue 2

Spring 2012

identifies the person. And Chicago mails notices directly to
that person, in his own name.188
Given that the Seventh Circuit has expressed an intent not to
interpret DPPA so as to produce an absurd result, has acknowledged its
legislative purpose, and has concluded that a parking offender can be
properly identified through his license plate number, it could easily
interpret “for use in serving process” in such a way as to find
Palatine’s policy impermissible under §2721(b).
C. Wiles v. Worldwide, Judge Ripple’s Dissent, and the Risk of
Identity Theft
One of Palatine’s arguments at the February 9, 2012, en banc
hearing was that DPPA was enacted before Internet use became
widespread, and that the easy access to information about people on
the World Wide Web has made the nondisclosure provisions of DPPA
largely irrelevant.189 Even accepting this argument, one generally still
must be looking for a particular individual on the Internet, and one
must already know at a minimum the person’s name, and sometimes
more. Under Palatine’s parking citation policy, a stalker could follow
an attractive woman until she receives a ticket, copy the information
on it, and learn who she is, where she lives, and how old she is. If he
went directly to the state licensing authority, even if he somehow
learned her name, his request for more information about her would be
denied. An identity thief could copy information from a parking ticket
on any luxury car, assume that it belongs to an affluent individual, and
possess enough information to open a credit account in that person’s
name.

188
189

Id.
En banc reh’g, supra note 132.
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According to the Federal Trade Commission, up to nine million
Americans have their identities stolen each year.190 Common methods
employed by identity thieves are rummaging through dumpsters to
find discarded bills and other documents with personal identifying
information, and stealing wallets.191 They then use the information to
open credit card accounts, bank accounts, and utility accounts in the
unsuspecting victim’s name, sometimes even fraudulently filing
bankruptcy.192 The information revealed to a potential identity thief on
Palatine’s parking ticket is the same information the thief would find
on a person’s driver’s license retrieved from a wallet. There is also the
possibility that a person’s vehicle could be stolen and receive a
parking ticket while in the thief’s possession, giving the thief a
windfall of private information.
The narrow interpretation of the DPPA exceptions proposed by
the Missouri district court in Wiles v. Worldwide and in Judge Ripple’s
dissent in Senne should be adopted by the Seventh Circuit and other
federal courts in determining what disclosures and uses are
permissible under DPPA.193 This approach reasons that “the
interpretation most consistent with congressional intent requires that
disclosure of personal information be narrowly tailored to a specific
permissible purpose.”194 Under this view, the “for use” language in the
exceptions clause would be interpreted as a use reasonable in carrying
out the user’s purpose. It would not prevent any law enforcement or
other municipal agency from obtaining a registered vehicle owner’s
identity from a state, only require that they limit their use to that
necessary to their purpose. They should not redisclose the information
to another—whether identified or, in the case of Senne, unidentified—
unless the new recipient also has a permissible purpose under
190

Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, About Identify Theft, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft//consumers/aboutidentity-theft.html (last visited May 3, 2012).
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See Wiles, 809 F.Supp.2d 1059 et seq.; Senne, 645 F.3d at 926 (Ripple, J.,
dissenting).
194
Wiles, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1076.
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§2721(b).195 This approach would balance the personal privacy and
safety concerns behind the Act’s passage with the legitimate needs of
government. A more restrictive reading of what uses should be
allowed under the exceptions in DPPA would be in keeping with the
spirit of the law while doing no violence to the text of the statute.
CONCLUSION
With recent federal interpretation of DPPA—from the Seventh
Circuit in Senne, the Fifth Circuit in Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit in
Thomas, along with lower court rulings—DPPA’s exceptions clause
threatens to weaken and even devour the protections Congress
intended to give drivers in the Act. However, legislative history,
minority judicial DPPA interpretations, long-established canons of
statutory construction, and Supreme Court dicta on informational
privacy point to an alternative application that courts should follow if
the safeguards in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act are not to
become meaningless.

195

See §2721(c) on redisclosure.
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